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RECOGNIZING MULTIJURISDICTION CLASS ACTION
JUDGMENTS WITHIN CANADA: KEY QUESTIONS SUGGESTED ANSWERS
The law of res judicata may have to adapt itself to
the class proceeding concept.

1. Introduction
With the advent of parallel multijurisdiction class actions in
Canada, we need to develop a workable means of coordinating them.
To do so we must establish standards for granting or denying
preclusive effect to class action judgments and for exercising
jurisdiction over them, and we must find ways to assess when
parallel actions should be consolidated and to determine which
courts should decide them.
In this commentary I offer six suggestions on how we might
approach these issues. I do so in response to the following questions:
WHO is affected by recognizing class action judgments from other
jurisdictions?
WHAT did Morguard really say about recognizing class action
judgments?
WHEN have courts recognized class action judgments (and when
have they refused)?
WHERE should multijurisdiction class actions be decided in
Canada?
WHY should Canadian courts recognize class action judgments?
HOW should the appropriate forum be determined?
The suggestions I make are as follows:
First, we should not limit our concerns to the interests of the named
parties and the class members who might sue separately because their
interests are already addressed by the existing law of resjudicataand
by relatively straightforward adaptations of it. Rather, we should
also consider the interests of a third group of class members- those
I.

Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary(Canada) Ltd. (1995), 129 D.L.R. (4th) 110,
25 O.R. (3d) 331 at p. 347 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), leave to appeal to C.A. refused
7 C.P.C. (4th) 206.
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who are unlikely to sue separately, as their interests reflect the special
concerns of class actions.
Second, while the Morguardprinciplesmay provide inspiration for
the answers we seek, the Morguarddecision cannot supply the details
of the standards and practices that we need to develop because
Morguardwas a case about the preclusive effect ofjudgments on the
interests of named parties, and in particular, named defendants. It
was not about the special interests of class members, and in
particular, the interests of this third group - unnamed plaintiffs
who could not or would not sue separately.
Third, despite the deference that Canadian courts have shown to
foreign judgments generally, and to foreign class actions judgments
in particular, there have been some striking instances in the past year
in which Canadian courts have refused to recognize Canadian class
action judgments and to grant preclusive effect to them. These
decisions highlight the concerns of these courts for the interests of this
third group in ensuring adequate recovery or adequate incentives to
more responsible conduct on the part of the defendants and whether
these interests are best served by recognizing the decision of another
court and refusing to try the matter again locally.
Fourth, while the refusal to recognize a judgment in a class action
suggests that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction simpliciterto decide
the case, this question is better understood as a question of
appropriate forum.
Fifth, an appropriate forum is one in which we are confident that
the interests in adequate recovery or adequate protection from
continued harm or similar harm will be well served, thus obviating the
need for the matter to be heard elsewhere. Other factors may need to
be developed to choose between appropriate fora where it is desirable
to do so.
Sixth, this critical determination of appropriate forum is better
made at or before the certification stage than after a judgment or
settlement approval has been rendered. Further, such a
determination is best made by a multilateral body, such as one
modeled on the U.S. Multidistrict Litigation Panel with necessary
procedural modifications to address the fact that it would operate in
Canada as a body comprised of the members of otherwise
independent courts.
2. WHO is Affected by Recognizing Class Action
Judgments from Other Jurisdictions?
As with all procedural reforms, to make workable rules for the
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recognition of multijurisdiction class actionjudgments in Canada, we
must be guided by a sense of whose interests are affected and how
these interests can best be served. Clearly, the named parties are
affected by recognizing a class action judgment from another
jurisdiction, but their interests are similar to those of the parties in
named party litigation. Their interests can be safeguarded by the
existing rules for the recognition of judgments.
A second group - class members -is also affected by recognizing
class action judgments from other jurisdictions. Their interests
present special concerns. They have not participated in the
proceeding, but they will be precluded from bringing their claims in
the court recognizing the judgment. 2 The interests of this second
group are new, but they have been considered on a number of
occasions. Safeguarding the rights to notice and an opportunity to
opt out, and to adequate representation, all support the interests of
those whose claims could be brought separately from the class.
Safeguards of this sort are well established in domestic class actions
regimes and they can be adapted to multijurisdiction class actions.
But what of class members whose claims could not readily be
brought in other proceedings? They constitute a distinct subset of the
second group or, perhaps, even a third group, in that their interests
may be different from those who might sue separately. From the
perspective of the principles underlying named party litigation, it is
arguable that the interests of this third group are not affected by
recognizing a class action judgment. They may have claims, but their
choses in action may be said to be worthless because those claims are
not economically viable and, as a result, their interests are not worth
protecting according to traditional standards. From the perspective
of class actions, however, the situation is very different. This third
group has much in common with any group of people in society who
have been harmed by wrongful conduct. If the members of this group
could receive substantial relief but their claims are not independently
economically viable, then their access to justice has been restricted. If
they could benefit from incentives to suppliers of goods and services
2.

This group is often divided into two - residents of the forum and non-residents.
However, the interests of these two groups are not really different from one
another. Courts do not ordinarily make jurisdictional rulings based on the
claimants' residence. Class actions regimes do not work that way either unless the
class description itself refers to residence. On the contrary, recognizing a class
action judgment precludes claims from being brought in the local courts by all
those who fall within the description of the class, whether they are residents or
non-residents. And recognizing a class action judgment cannot restrain
claimants, whether they are residents or non-residents, from taking their claims
to some other court.
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to act more responsibly, then they are part of a community whose
regulatory mechanisms may have been undermined. This is what a
class action could, and should, achieve for them.
Notice and an opportunity to opt out do little for the members of
this third group if they have no other way to sue for compensation or
redress. Even the adequacy of representation as a means of giving
them a chance to participate in the proceeding may seem less
important than whether the result provides adequate compensation
or redress. Focusing on the interests of this third group may help us to
develop a framework for the recognition of multijurisdiction class
action judgments in Canada - one based on the principles
underlying class actions.
Who is affected by recognizing class action judgmentsfrom other
jurisdictions?-Thoseaffected include named parties, class members
who could seek compensation or redress independently and, most
importantly, class members who could not.
But I am getting ahead of myself. It is better to begin at the
beginning by picking up the thread of the current discussion, one that
looks for answers in the law of jurisdiction and judgments and the
Court of
constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme
3
Canada in MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye.
3. WHAT Did Morguard Really Say About
Recognizing Class Action Judgments?
Many have said that in the Morguarddecision, the Supreme Court
of Canada discovered a "full faith and credit" clause in the
Constitution that required Canadian courts to recognize the
judgments of other Canadian courts. And the judgment did, in fact,
say that the taking of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its
recognition in another must be viewed as correlatives. As a result, the
"Morguard principles" are principles of jurisdiction as well. They
reflect constitutional standards for assuming jurisdiction.4
Many have also suggested that the reasoning and the standards
enunciated in Morguardapplyequally to the preclusive effect of class
action judgments on class members in other jurisdictions. If it does,
then where a Canadian court has exercised appropriately restrained
jurisdiction, and it has provided adequate notice and an opportunity
to opt out, there is a constitutional obligation to recognize the
judgment. Despite this, some Canadian courts are refusing to grant
3.
4.

[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256.
Vaughan Black, "The Other Side of Morguard: New Limits on Judicial
Jurisdiction" (1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 4.
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preclusive effect to class action judgments and they are doing so for
what seem to be compelling reasons.
To understand why class action judgments are being denied
recognition, it is helpful to have another look at what the Supreme
Court of Canada actually said in Morguard. Starting with the
obvious, there was no "full faith and credit" clause to be discovered in
the Canadian Constitution. Such a clause does exist in the U.S.
Constitution 5 and it creates a fixed obligation for American courts to
recognize one another's judgments - whether or not it seems fair to
do so under the circumstances. The American courts soon realized
that a fixed obligation such as this could cause considerable mischief
unless they established a means of guaranteeing a measure of fairness
to the persons affected. Eventually, the due process clauses in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were pressed into service as a
foundation for basic jurisdictional standards. 6 These jurisdictional
standards prevent the hardship and confusion that could arise from
the obligation to recognize judgments from courts that ought not to
have exercised jurisdiction.
The balance between the duty to recognize judgments and the duty
to be fair to the parties affected is echoed in Morguard in the
"principles of order and fairness." 7 However, there is a difference. In
Morguard,the analysis proceeded from the opposite direction. It did
not take a fixed obligation to recognize judgments and address the
harm it could cause by adding constitutional safeguards to ensure
fairness. Rather, the court observed that "concerns about differential
quality of justice among the provinces can have no real foundation"
in Canada and therefore "a full faith and credit clause was
unnecessary . . ." Generous standards for the recognition of
judgments are implied in a federation and, in any event, within the
Canadian federation, there were unlikely to be sound reasons for a
party to object to the recognition of judgments from other parts of
Canada on the basis of fairness.
This difference in the Supreme Court's reasoning is important in
5.
6.
7.

Article IV. 1 provides that "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state."
InternationalShoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at p. 316 (1945).
Which in the common law provinces operate through the counterpart to the U.S.
"minimum contacts test," the "real and substantial connection test." Although it
was necessary for the common law provinces to add this ground ofjurisdiction to
those of "consent" and "presence of the defendant" in their rules for recognizing
judgments, this was not necessary for Quebec, where the international jurisdiction of Quebec authorities is provided for in Title III of Book X of the Code Civil:
Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205, 220
D.L.R. (4th) 54.
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understanding the recent refusals by Canadian courts to recognize
class action judgments from other Canadian courts. It would be
wrong to dismiss these refusals as recalcitrance or a failure to
appreciate the constitutional obligations enunciated in the Morguard
decision. Canadian courts recognize Canadian judgments in named
party litigation because no unfairness results. That is why a full faith
and credit clause, though necessary to the operation of a federation,
did not have to be written into the Canadian Constitution. It is true
that recognition of class action judgments may also be necessary to
the Canadian federation, but where Canadian courts find that
unfairness would result, we must find ways to ensure that the process
is fair so that a workable system for their recognition can be
established.
The decisions of courts refusing to recognize Canadian class
actions judgments are important indications of the way forward.
They highlight the ways in which class actions are different from
named party litigation. In adopting a regime for class actions, we
might have thought that we were just tweaking the rules of procedure
to facilitate the aggregation of claims and to enhance the ability of
ordinary named party litigation to promote three well-established
objectives of litigation (access to justice, judicial economy and
behaviour modification). But in the years since, the rivers of ink
spilled and the forests felled in coming to terms with the sui generis
issues arising in class actions bear testament to the fundamental
differences between class actions and ordinary litigation. What we
are discovering as class actions procedure develops is that class
actions are not so much a procedural adjustment designed to
facilitate the adjudication of claims that would otherwise be difficult
to pursue as they are a way of enabling courts to participate in a kind
of regulation that would otherwise be beyond their purview and, as a
result, to play a new role in society.
A detailed discussion of this new role is beyond the scope of this
paper, but the point is relevant to understanding the equities at stake
in recognizing class action judgments. That class actions do much
more than we thought they would, and so require special rules for
jurisdiction and judgments, is news - not only to us, but, it would
seem, to almost every country that has adopted them. Taking the
United States as an example, in the history of American class actions,
it was 40 years after the U.S. Supreme Court made its famous
pronouncement on due process, 8 and almost 20 years after the
introduction of class actions, 9 that the U.S. Supreme Court
8.
9.

In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 23.
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considered in the Shutts case how the due process clause would apply
in the class actions context.1 0 Twenty years later, it is still not obvious
to outsiders reading the court's reasoning in Shutts how the due
process guarantees provide the appropriate analytical framework for
addressing the interests of the third group described above.
Accordingly, the question in Canada is not whether a
constitutional requirement of full faith and credit that was
discovered by the Supreme Court in Morguard can be applied to
multijurisdiction class actions, but whether workable standards can
be established to make it reasonable to recognize class action
judgments as precluding the claims of class members from being
commenced afresh. Morguard was a decision that enunciated
important general principles of broad application, but in its
specifics, it set the standards for recognizing and enforcing
judgments in named party litigation. Those standards were
designed for the interests of the first group (named parties) and, at
best, they can be adapted to serve the interests of the second group
(those who could sue independently), but they cannot serve the
interests of the third group - ordinary class members with no other
means of suing for compensation or redress. It is possible that the
refusals in recent decisions of Canadian courts to recognize class
action judgments from other Canadian courts were motivated by a
sense that the interests of this third group needed to be served better.
Pursuing that line of inquiry seems far more promising than straining
to find applicable rules in a decision on the law of foreign judgments.
What did Morguard really say about recognizing class action
judgments? The Morguard decision supplies the constitutional
principles of order and fairness but we must develop jurisdictional
standards and other procedures for serving the interests of all three
groups affected by the recognition of class actions in order to develop
a system consistent with the needs of the Canadian federation.
4. WHEN Have Courts Recognized Class Action
Judgments (and When Have They Refused)?
It might surprise persons from outside Canada to learn that
Canadian courts have seemed more willing to recognize foreign class
action judgments than they have been to recognize class action
judgments from other parts of Canada. Nevertheless, examining a
few of the situations in which the courts have recognized class action
judgments and those in which they have refused to do so can shed light
10.

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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on the considerations underlying a workable system for the
recognition of class action judgments.
In Currie v. McDonald's Canada, a class action against
McDonald's Canada for fraud in the allocation of prizes in
promotional games offered to Canadian customers, McDonald's
sought to dismiss the Canadian action on the basis that the matter had
been resolved by an Illinois judgment approving the settlement of a
class action that purported to include the Canadian class members.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that a foreign class action
judgment could have preclusive effect provided there was a real and
substantial connection between the matter and the forum, the nonresident class members were adequately represented and they were
accorded procedural fairness, including adequate notice and an
opportunity to opt out. " This reasoning was consistent with the
previous decisions rendered in challenges to the jurisdiction of
Ontario courts to certify multijurisdiction class actions: 2 it addresses
the interests of the first and second groups of persons described earlier
- the named parties and those whose claims could be brought
elsewhere.
However, in other cases that have considered the preclusive effect
of class actions judgments from other provinces, the courts have held
that the judgments could not operate to preclude a local class from
bringing an independent claim seeking a different result. For
example, in L~pine v. CanadaPost,13 Cybersurf sold its software for
$9.95 through Canada Post and said it would provide free Internet
access in exchange for posting advertisements on the user's computer
screen. When it began to charge its users $9.95 per month for access,
class actions were commenced in Ontario and Quebec. The Ontario
class action purported to include Quebec residents, and so the
residents of Quebec received notices for both class actions. When the
defendant brought a motion in Quebec to have the Ontario decision
recognized as precluding the Quebec action, the Quebec court refused
to do so because the duplicate notices received by the Quebec
residents might cause confusion.'
11.

Currie v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., [2005] O.J. No. 506 (QL) at

para. 30, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 224 (C.A.).
12.

Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd, supra, footnote 1; Carom v.

Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 441, 30 C.P.C. (4th) 133 (Gen. Div.);
Wilson v. Servier Canada Inc. (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 219, 49 C.P.C. (4th) 233

13.

(S.C.J.), leave to appeal to Div. Ct. refused 52 O.R. (3d) 20, 143 O.A.C. 279 (Div.
Ct.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 154 O.A.C. 198n.
[2005] Q. No. 9806 (QL), J.E. 2005-1631, EYB 2005-93155 (C.S.), affd [2007]
J.Q. No. 8498, [2007] R.J.Q. 1920, 2007 QCCA 1092, J.E. 2007-1615, EYB 2007122903 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 495.
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In HSBC Bank Canada v. Hocking, 15 penalties were charged
improperly to mortgagors who paid out their mortgages early and,
again, two class actions were brought- one in Ontario on behalf of
all Canadian residents and one in Quebec on behalf of residents of
Quebec. This time, the plaintiff in the Quebec action sought to
intervene in the Ontario action but was denied permission to do so.
The class action was certified in Ontario and a settlement was
approved. The defendant brought a motion in Quebec to have the
Ontario judgment recognized as precluding the Quebec action from
proceeding. The court refused because the claims before it had no
connection with Ontario, the representative plaintiff in the Quebec
action was not able to participate in the negotiations between the
parties to the Ontario action, the members of the class would not
receive any compensation under the terms of the award, and they
were denied an opportunity to participate in the Ontario proceeding
when their motion to intervene was rejected. All in all, it was not clear
that their particular concerns would be 6addressed in the resolution of
the matter in the Ontario proceeding.'
When have courtsrecognizedclass actionjudgments (and when have
they refused)? Procedural fairness requires adequate representation
and notice and an opportunity to opt out, but this is not always
enough. To serve the interests of the third group - those who are
unlikely to sue separately but who, nevertheless, are entitled to have
their interests adequately represented - it must be assured that this
group's particular concerns will be addressed in the proceeding, and
that it will not be deprived of appropriate recovery or redress as a
result of having the matter decided in a distant forum that may be
insensitive to its particular interests.
5. WHERE Should Multijurisdiction Class
Actions Be Decided in Canada?
17
For the reasons considered at length in a number of decisions,
14.

Ibid., at para. 38.

15.

[2006] J.Q. No. 507, [2006] R.J.Q. 804, 2006 QCCS 330, J.E. 2006-517, EYB

16.

2006-100504 (S.C.), affd Hocking v. Haziza et HSBC Bank Canada, [2008] 50009-016435-067 (C.A.) (citing this commentary as presented to the National
Judicial Institute on April 9, 2008).
Ibid., at para. 78 ("La situation pr~valant dans le present dossier, aux yeux du
Tribunal, n'est pas conforme aux principes d'ordre et d'6quit6 : la rclamation des
membres qu~becois n'a aucun lien avec le forum ontarien, le repr~sentant
qu~bcois a tent6 sans succ~s de participer aux n~gociations entreprises entre
Hocking et HSBC, les membres ne regoivent aucune compensation suite au
r~glement et ils n'ont pas r6ussi fi faire valoir leur point de vue devant le Tribunal
ontarien, leur intervention ayant t& rejet~e").
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there is simply no credible challenge to be made to the basic
jurisdiction of Canadian courts to certify multijurisdiction class
actions.1 8 This is not to say that there is no jurisdictional question to
be raised in determining whether to recognize a class actionjudgment
or, to put it another way, that there are no jurisdictional standards to
be developed in creating a workable regime of multijurisdiction class
actions in Canada. Rather, it is to say that the question is not properly
one of jurisdiction simpliciter.
Several courts have recognized the merits of having common issues
decided in a single proceeding despite the fact that these might involve
the claims of persons arising in different provinces. While it stretches
the logic of a "real and substantial connection" to say that the real and
substantial connection test supports jurisdiction over those claims,
some Canadian courts have felt obliged to base their conclusion on
that test. For example, in response to a challenge to its jurisdiction to
determine on an opt-in basis claims that had arisen in other provinces,
the British Columbia Supreme Court said that the common issue
could serve as a basis for jurisdiction because "it is that common issue
which establishes the real and substantial connection necessary for
jurisdiction."' 19 Similarly, in a recent Ontario decision, it was
observed that the courts in Ontario accept "as a sufficiently real
and substantial connection a commonality of interest between nonresident class members and those who are resident in the forum and
whose causes of action have sufficiently real and substantial
connections to it20 to ground jurisdiction over their claims against
the defendants."
But this does not end the matter. There may be no question of
jurisdiction simpliciter, but there is certainly a question of
17.
18.

19.

See cases cited supra, footnote 12.
Although class actions legislation is promulgated pursuant to the constitutional
grant to the provinces of exclusive authority to make laws in relation to
procedure in civil matters and this grant contains a limit on the extraterritorial
operation of that authority, s. 92 provides for legislative authority, not judicial
authority. The judicial jurisdiction of the superior courts of Canada is founded
on the traditional authority of the courts of England and the provinces as
reflected in s. 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and it is informed by the
principles of order and fairness. See J. Walker, The Constitution of Canada and
the Conflict of Laws (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 2001) [available at the
Library of Canada].
Harrington v. Dow Corning Corp. (1997), 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88, 8 C.P.C. (4th) 262

(S.C.).
20.

McCutcheon v. Cash Store Inc., [2006] O.J. No. 1860 (QL) at para. 49, 80 O.R.
(3d) 644 (S.C.J.). In Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,

[2007] O.J. No. 676 (QL), 47 C.C.L.I. (4th) 78, 38 C.P.C. (6th) 373 (S.C.J.) the
court held that including class members subject to different statutory regimes was

not a bar to certification.
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appropriate forum. If there was only one court in Canada capable of
determining class actions, we would find ways to ensure to the extent
possible that the benefits of the class actions decided in that court
were enjoyed in all the communities throughout the country where
the cause of action arose. But now we have class actions in most
Canadian jurisdictions and we must find ways to address the concerns
arising from overlapping and competing class actions without losing
the benefits to the various communities that might be gained by local
representation, local adjudication and local awards. In this way it is
not so much that the rules of jurisdiction and judgments need to be
adapted to the class actions context as it is that the procedures
developed for contested carriage motions and settlement approval
hearings in class action procedure need to be adapted to take into
account the special concerns of multijurisdiction situations.
Englund v. Pfizer CanadaInc. illustrates the challenges we face. The
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench refused to stay a proposed
class proceeding on behalf of Saskatchewan residents who were
presumptively included in the multijurisdiction class action that was
pending in Ontario because that would "recognize legislation enabled
by other jurisdictions that intentionally encroaches on the right of its
residents to seek judicial recourse for losses they suffered as a
consequence of a tort or breach of the law committed within the
Province." 2 1 On appeal, the decision was reversed by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal because the plaintiffs, who, it
seems, were the same in both proceedings, had shown no reason
why the matter could not be heard in a single proceeding in either
forum and the court held that they should be put to their election. In
its order, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal granted
a stay that could
22
be lifted if the Ontario action was discontinued. The plaintiffs were
then permitted by the Ontario court to discontinue the Ontario optout national class in favour of the Saskatchewan opt-in national class,
which counsel preferred because Saskatchewan is a "no costs"
jurisdiction. 2 3 It is not clear whether combining the interests of
plaintiffs' counsel in trial in a "no-costs" jurisdiction with the
interests of defendants in trial in a jurisdiction that requires nonresident class members to opt in also served the best interests of the
class members. What is clear is that it is difficult for courts to resolve
21.

Englund v. Pfizer CanadaInc., [2006] S.J. No. 9 (QL) at para. 44, [2006]7 W.W.R.

22.

Englund v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2007] S.. No. 273 (QL), 284 D.L.R. (4th) 94,
(C.A.).
Sollen v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 866 (QL), 290 D.L.R. (4th) 603

128 (Q.B.).
23.

(S.C.J.).
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questions of overlapping class actions in the course of independent,
unilateral and sequential rulings based only on the submissions of
counsel for one class.
To facilitate these determinations Saskatchewan passed the Class
Actions Amendment Act, 2007,24 which came into force on April 1,
2008. Sections 2 and 4 of the Saskatchewan Class Actions Act were
amended to include a definition of multi-jurisdictional class action as
"an action that is brought on behalf of a class of persons that includes
persons who reside in Saskatchewan and persons who do not reside in
Saskatchewan" and to require a person who commences such an
action to "give notice of the application for certification to the
representative plaintiff in any other multi-jurisdictional class action,
or any proposed multi-jurisdictional class action, commenced
elsewhere in Canada that involves the same or similar subjectmatter."
Where should multijurisdictionclass actionsbe decided in Canada?
This is the key question that we face, but it is best answered in two
parts, which will comprise the last two parts of this commentary.
First, we must develop a more nuanced approach to the choices
between appropriate fora by considering the interests of the third
group and why, from their perspective, it might be reasonable to
recognize class actionsjudgments from other courts. Second, we must
develop adjudicative mechanisms to enable the multilateral
determination of the appropriate forum for class actions in Canada
that can operate in a legal system comprised of independently
administered courts.
6. WHY Should Canadian Courts Recognize
Class Action Judgments?
All private law litigation serves the combined purposes of
compensating persons for losses suffered and creating incentives to
others to act responsibly so as to avoid causing such loss. One
extraordinary feature of class actions that has only become clear with
experience is that as the aggregation of claims increases the ability of
private law litigation to serve these purposes, it also tends to drive a
wedge between them.
Some class actions serve primarily the needs of persons who have
suffered measurable losses that would go uncompensated but for
their ability to join together to seek relief. Other class actions,
involving nominal losses, serve primarily the needs of the broader
public to be protected from misconduct by establishing effective
24.

S.S. 2007, c. 1, amending the Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01.
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sanctions to encourage more responsible conduct. It would be wrong
to suggest that there is an absolute distinction between these two
kinds of class actions, but much confusion has resulted from trying to
develop principles and procedures for both without regard to the
differences between them.
In the first kind of class action that commenced primarily to
promote access to justice for those who have suffered measurable
losses, the pressing considerations in resolving the matter relate to the
adequacy of the recovery. In class actions, adequate recovery will
almost always amount to a compromise between what the claimants
"should" receive and what is reasonably available. Claimants often
receive far less than what they might receive if they were to claim
individually, but this is an abstract consideration because, as a
practical matter, their claims could not be brought independently and
these claims have been aggregated to make them economically viable.
The question in the multijurisdiction context is whether the relief
granted to these persons has been diminished by reason of the fact
that it was granted by a court other than the court being asked to
recognize the judgment. This could be as a result of differences in the
legal principles that the recognizing court would itself apply, or as a
result of some other jurisdiction-specific feature of the litigation. Of
course, considerable care would need to be taken in conducting a
review of this sort to ensure that the availability of review was not
taken merely as an opportunity to re-open the litigation, or to argue
why different counsel might have achieved a different result - other
than for forum-specific reasons. And to the extent that review of this
sort was available in principle, it would be likely that these issues
would be anticipated and addressed directly in a judgment or
settlement approval, perhaps one that benefited from interventions
from those who might otherwise challenge the result.
Indeed, to the extent that review of the relief granted might always
have an inherent tendency to undermine the finality of class action
judgments it would be preferable to develop a means for addressing
this concern as a matter of course, at the certification stage, as will be
discussed in the next section. Where such concerns are justified,
certainty would be enhanced by ensuring that the class of persons who
might be prejudiced by being prevented access to the court to which
they would otherwise resort are given appropriate relief as a sub-class
or are presumptively excluded from the original class action.
Different considerations arise in the second kind of class action that involving nominal losses and that is commenced primarily to
serve the needs of the broader public by establishing effective
sanctions to encourage more responsible conduct. In these actions,
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the question is whether recognizing the judgment will provide
adequate incentives to the defendant, and to others who might cause
similar harm, to take steps to avoid causing such harm in the future
not only in the jurisdiction where the judgment was issued but also in
the jurisdiction in which recognition is sought.
In conducting this analysis there may be a tendency to assume that
local measures are the best protection for the local public. But any
regulatory measures, including class actions, involve public expense
and so the benefits of an additional local action would be weighed
against the likelihood that the judgment would provide adequate
incentives to the defendant and to others similarly situated to
improve their conduct in ways that would benefit not only the public
in the forum where the judgment was issued but also in the forum
where the judgment is recognized. That some foreign class action
judgments are capable of providing effective incentives to engage in
responsible conduct locally could explain the inclination of the
Ontario court to recognize the U.S. judgment in the case against
McDonald's discussed above. Nevertheless, where an award
provides nominal or no compensation for class members and,
instead, requires some contribution to the welfare of the broader
community, courts may be concerned to ensure that the communities
that benefit include those in the fora in which other class actions
might be commenced. This could explain the disinclination of the
Quebec court to recognize the Ontario judgment in the case against
Canada Post discussed above.
The considerations described above are reasons for recognizing
class action judgments from other courts, but they can also provide
guidance in the processes of defining the class, measuring the
adequacy of representation and the litigation plan, resolving
contested carriage motions, and assessing the adequacy of the
proposed relief in a settlement hearing.
In some cases, these considerations would be enough to determine
where a multijurisdiction class action would best be decided, but in
other cases, these requirements might be met in more than one
jurisdiction. To assist in addressing these situations s. 6 of the
Saskatchewan Class Actions Act 25 now provides guidance to courts
in determining when to certify a multijurisdiction class action in
circumstances in which there is a competing multijurisdiction class
action as follows:
6(2) If a multi-jurisdictional class action, or a proposed multi-jurisdictional class action, has been commenced elsewhere in Canada that involves
25.

Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01.
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the subject-matter that is the same as or similar to that of the action being
considered pursuant to this section, the court shall determine whether it
would be preferable for some or all of the claims or common issues raised by
those claims of the proposed class members to be resolved in that class
action.
(3) For the purposes of making a determination pursuant to subsection (2),
the court shall:
(a) be guided by the following objectives:
(i) ensuring that the interests of all of the parties in each of the
relevant jurisdictions are given due consideration;
(ii) ensuring that the ends of justice are served;
(iii) avoiding, where possible, the risk of irreconcilable judgments;
(iv) promoting judicial economy; and
(b) consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) the alleged basis of liability, including the applicable laws;
(ii) the stage each of the actions has reached;
(iii) the plan for the proposed multi-jurisdictional class action, including the viability of the plan and the capacity and resources for
advancing the action on behalf of the proposed class;
(iv) the location of the representative plaintiffs and class members in
the various actions, including the ability of representative plaintiffs
to participate in the actions and to represent the interests of the
class members;
(v) the location of evidence and witnesses.

Despite the range of these criteria, it may be necessary to consider
additional criteria developed by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation in the United States Federal Court (the MDL Panel) in the
selection of a particular district for transfer of multi-district actions
for consolidated pretrial proceedings. These factors include:
*

that the district is easily accessible, or a convenient, central
location with respect to all the actions, or the parties,
documents or witnesses
• the district's neutral status
" the pendency in that district of a number of the actions
" the pendency of related civil actions or agency proceedings
* the district court's familiarity with the issues involved in the
litigation
* the favorable status of the caseload or civil dockets in the
district as where the district did not have any other multidistrict litigation on its docket
" that the district is a metropolitan district, well equipped with
the resources that the complex docket was likely to require
* that significant discovery is likely to take place in the district
* that the district is site of the furthest advanced action
* all of the parties' agreement to the transfer
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the transferee judge's prior, successful experience with multidistrict litigation

Why should Canadiancourts recognizeclass actionjudgmen ts?They
should do so because, where appropriate, the persons who might
otherwise seek recovery from them are not prejudiced by having had
their rights being determined in another forum, or because the
incentives to defendants and others similarly situated to modify their
behaviour will result in sufficient benefits to the community of the
recognizing court to render a local class action unwarranted. Beyond
this, Canadian courts may be guided in further developing the rules
for determining the appropriate forum or fora for the litigation of a
class action or related class actions by referring to the factors
considered by the U.S. MDL Panel.
7. HOW Should the Appropriate Forum Be Determined?
A discussion of the standards to be applied in determining the
appropriate forum for multijurisdiction class actions is only of
practical benefit if there is an adjudicative mechanism or body
capable of making determinations binding on the parties in all the
possible fora throughout Canada. It is becoming increasingly evident
that there is a potential for this sort of determination, when made in
the existing adjudicative structure of independently administered
courts, to suffer from incomplete information or conflicts between
the interests of counsel and the class. 27 Even where the court has the
benefit of argument concerning the merits of deferring to an existing
competing multijurisdiction class action, there continues to be a risk
of conflicting determinations.
For example, in the decision by the Saskatchewan court to certify
28 a
multijurisdiction class in Wuttunee v. Merck FrosstCanadaLtd. the
court was not dissuaded from doing so by the fact that counsel
seeking certification of a multijurisdiction class action had previously
failed to win carriage of the same action in Ontario in a decision in
which carriage in a multijurisdiction class that did not include the
claims of Saskatchewan residents 29 had been awarded to a
26.
27.
28.
29.

C. Wright and G. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 3d (St. Paul,
Minn., West, 1969), § 3864.
See supra, footnote 22.
2008 SKQB 229.
The routine informal practice of excluding Quebec claimants from multijurisdiction classes, as occurred in this case, may change as a result of the determination
in Brito v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2008] J.Q. No. 4642, 2008 QCCS 2231, J.E. 20081215 (S.C.) that Quebec courts are also competent to decide multijurisdiction
class actions.
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consortium of Canadian counsel. Although the Saskatchewan court
relied on the expectation that the Ontario court would stay the class
action before it awaiting certification, the Ontario court declined to
do so and, instead, proceeded to certify the multijurisdiction class
action in Ontario. The Ontario court refrained from critiquing the
Saskatchewan judgment but observed that "It does not, however,
follow that I should now defer to the decision to the extent of ordering
a stay of the proceeding that, in this court, was held be more
advantageous to the class than the similar action... in Saskatchewan.
I am satisfied that, by themselves, principles of comity do not require
such a result. Comity is ... a two-way street." 3 0 And, after carefully
reviewing the reasons indicated in favour of deferring to the
Saskatchewan proceeding, the court concluded:
None of the above suggested grounds for preferring the proceeding in
Saskatchewan satisfies me that the plaintiffs in that action should be
permitted to derail the decision of this court in the carriage motion to which
Mr Wuttunee and their counsel, as well as Merck, were parties.

Of course a multiplicity of actions raising the same claims among the same
parties is to be avoided. But why does it follow that the plaintiffs and their
counsel in Wuttunee #2 should now be permitted to undermine the decision
of Winkler J. by moving to expand the class in Wuttunee #2 at a time when,
to their knowledge, the parties in this action had prepared for the certification
motion and the hearing was imminent?

I wish to emphasise that my decision to refuse to stay this proceeding will not
reflect acceptance of a principle that would assign priority to jurisdictions in
which claims are first made, or issues first determined. The practice of
rushing to commence overlapping actions in as many jurisdictions as
possible in order to claim turf and secure carriage for law firms - rather
than to advance the interests of a putative class - gives ambulance-chasing
a good name and, in my opinion, smacks of an abuse of process.

While I am not convinced that the problems that will be created by the
continuation of the two actions are insoluble, the result is, of course,
unfortunate. If decisions of provincial courts on carriage motions are not to
be respected throughout Canada, this merely underlines - and makes even
more urgent - the need for an agreement or protocol among the superior
courts that will provide for nationally-accepted carriage motions and
determine the jurisdiction in which such motions will be heard. 3 '

30. Tiboni v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd., 2008 CanLIl 37911 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 21.
31. Ibid., at paras. 33-41.
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Despite the urgency, establishing a mechanism or body to make a
single determination within the structure of the Canadian judicial
system with its independently administered courts will require
considerable collective will and some ingenuity.
In its Report on National Class Actions, the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada's Committee canvassed the options. 32 The
committee acknowledged the merits of the approach taken by the
United States Federal Court in establishing the MDL Panel. However,
it seemed unlikely that the Constitution Act, 1867 could be
interpreted to permit such authority to be vested in the Federal
Court of Canada, and the political will needed to create a new court
pursuant to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, seemed unlikely to
emerge. The committee reflected on the possibility that such a body
could operate as a committee of the Canadian Judicial Council, which
was created ". . . to promote efficiency and uniformity, and to
improve the quality of judicial service, in superior courts," but this,
too, seemed ambitious.
Ultimately, the committee proposed a series of principles that
could be applied by Canadian courts in the ordinary course of
determining motions for certification. Though this option was less
likely to be as effective as an authoritative multilateral body, there
seemed no way to endow a multilateral body with the necessary
authority. How could such a body decide on behalf of a superior court
in Canada whether it should or should not exercise jurisdiction over a
matter before it? And so it was hoped that a central registry granting
ready access to the information on class actions commenced across
the country, and a sense of the urgency of coordinating
multijurisdiction class actions, would encourage the provincial
superior courts operating independently to generate an informal
system of cooperation.
Since the time the report was adopted by the Uniform Law
Conference, the need to develop an effective means of coordinating
multijurisdiction class actions has become even more pressing, as is
evident from the rulings discussed above. Further reflection suggests
that it may be possible to develop a means of overcoming the hurdles
of an independently administered court system to create a Canadian
version of the U.S. MDL Panel, based on a model proposed by Chief
Justice Winkler, which in Canada3 3could be called a Multijurisdiction
Class Proceedings Panel (MCPP).
32.
33.

The report is available online: ULCC <www.ulcc.ca>.
Correspondence with Chief Justice Winkler, re "The Winkler Amendment",
April 2, 2007, Toronto.
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The procedural reforms necessary to establish such a panel include
two components: a revised function for the national registry, and a
deliberative body comprised of representatives of all the courts that
might be appropriate fora for multijurisdiction class actions in
Canada. In such a system, ajudge of the court in which the matter was
first commenced would participate with others in a hearing panel.
When it came time to adopt the decision of the panel, the judge, as a
member of that court, could either stay the matter or ask the Chief
Justice of that court to assign it to a member of the court. Also in such
a system, the Attorneys General of the other Canadian provinces
could act as nominal plaintiffs in actions commenced proforma and
stayed pending the determination of the MCPP. Here is how the system
could work:
With respect to the registry, each province with class proceedings
legislation could pass legislation requiring parties who commence
multijurisdiction class actions to forward the notice of proceeding to
a centralized registry upon issuing it in the province. The registry,
which could be developed from the existing National Class Actions
Database, would be authorized by the legislation to receive the
notices of proceedings and to forward them to the Attorneys General
of each province to be reissued in their provinces with the Attorneys
General serving as the nominal applicants in matters styled "In Re
Multijurisdiction Class Proceeding Concerning..."). The provincial
legislation would further provide that a stay would automatically be
issued in those proceedings and in any related proceedings
subsequently issued in the province pending a determination by the
panel.
With respect to the panel, the Chief Justice of each jurisdiction
could designate ajudge to serve as a member. Hearing panels could be
struck periodically to hear applications, consisting of two judges and
an alternate. Panels assigned to specific cases would be composed of
the two judges and a judge of the jurisdiction in which the matter was
first issued. Where the judge from the jurisdiction in which the matter
was first issued was already a member of the panel, the alternate
would be called upon to join the panel. With the panels constituted in
this way, the decision to issue a stay or directions to proceed could be
adopted by the judge of the court in which the matter was first issued
and, accordingly, would be rendered on the strength of that judge's
own authority as a member of the court in which the matter was
commenced.3 4 Once the panel had made its determination, the pro
34.

Measures would have to be developed to address situations in which the same or
a related proceeding was issued on the same day in more than one jurisdiction.
Adjustments in the panel could be made to enable judges from other provinces to
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forma proceedings commenced by the Attorneys General in the other
jurisdictions in which the matter was not to proceed could be
dismissed on consent attaching the ruling of the MCP Panel.
How should the appropriateforum be determined?The appropriate
forum for multijurisdiction class actions in Canada should be
determined by a Canadian equivalent to the U.S. MDL Panel adapted
to meet the needs of the Canadian federation.
Janet Walker*

sit on the panel. In cases in which counsel commence proceedings simultaneously
in multiple jurisdictions it may be desirable to require them to elect one
jurisdiction as the relevant jurisdiction for the purposes of MCP determinations.
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. This comment is an updated version of a
paper presented to the National Judicial Institute, Colloquium on Class Actions,
held at Osgoode Professional Development in Toronto on April 9, 2008.

